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Structured Abstract 
Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to explore the human factors triggering information 
leakage and investigate how companies mitigate insider threat for information sharing integrity. 
Design/methodology/approach – The methodology employed is multiple case studies 
approach with in-depth interviews with five Multinational Enterprises/Multinational 
Corporations. 
Findings – The findings reveal that information leakage can be approached with human 
governance mechanism such as organizational ethical climate and information security culture. 
Besides, higher frequency of leakages negatively affects information sharing integrity. 
Moreover, this paper also contributes to a research framework which could be a guide to 
overcome information leakage issue in information sharing. 
Research limitations/implications – The current study involved MNC/MNEs operating in 
Malaysia while companies in other countries may have different ethical climate and 
information sharing culture. Thus, for future research, it will be good to replicate the study in 
a larger geographic region to verify the findings and insights of this research.  
Practical implications – This research contributes to the industry and business that are striving 
towards solving the mounting problem of information leakage by raising awareness of human 
factors and to take appropriate mitigating governance strategies to pre-empt information 
leakage. This paper also contributes to a novel theoretical model that characterizes the 
iniquities of humans in sharing information, and suggests measures which could be a guide to 
avert disruptive leakages. 
Originality/value – This paper is likely an unprecedented research in moulding human 
governance in the domain of information sharing and its Achilles’ heel which is information 
leakage. 
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1. Introduction 
Advocates of information sharing had highlighted the potential benefits of using 
valuable information to improve overall organization performance (Fawcett, Osterhaus, 
Magnan, Brau, & McCarter, 2007; Kembro, Näslund, & Olhager, 2017). Information sharing 
is instrumental to foster collaboration and strengthen relationships among employees within an 
organization and across organizations with business partners (Lee & Whang, 2000). However, 
the advantages of information sharing can only be realized when the information shared 
between the sender and the receiver is integral, wholesome and undistorted (Durugbo, Tiwari, 
& Alcock, 2014; Kwon & Suh, 2005). In other words, the value of the information shared 
remains intact and uncontaminated. In many cases, inaccurate or distorted information create 
chaos and disruption to the organization (Cannella, Framinan, Bruccoleri, Barbosa-Póvoa, & 
Relvas, 2015; Dai, Li, Yan, & Zhou, 2016; Kwak & Gavirneni, 2015). The fearful cause of 
information inaccuracy and distortion in information sharing is internal information leakage. 
Many information sharing specialists believe that promoting technology to protect 
information against external attacks is an important method for making information sharing 
effective within organizations (Stoneburner, Goguen, Feringa, 2002; Sumner, Cantiello, 
Cortelyou-Ward, & Noblin, 2012). Surprisingly, although organizations always have been 
concerned about vulnerability to external threats, recent industry research indicates that a 
substantial amount of information leakage incidents actually originated from within the 
organization (Padayachee, 2016; Stanton et al., 2005). This is copiously supported by the 
Global Data Leakage Report 2016 of InfoWatch. Its latest issue of information leakage in 2016 
shows that among the data leaks logged, 38.2% of the cases were triggered by external attacks, 
while 61.8% were caused by internal offenders (InfoWatch, 2016). These insider leakages are 
major concerns and constitute the primary attention of this research. 
Information leakage refers to the act of intentional or unintentional disclosure of 
information to an unauthorized party (Anand and Goyal, 2009). Practically all companies are 
familiar to insiders posing risks due to their legitimate access to their organizations’ facilities, 
assets and valuable information (Colwill, 2009; Hunker & Probst, 2011; Magklaras & Furnell, 
2005). These insiders will likely know how to achieve the greatest impact while leaving behind 
little or no evidence (Colwill, 2009). These harmful loss and disclosures of business 
information are cited in business reports; and industry experiences have shown information 
leakage propagated by authorized user or insider threats are continually succeeding in harming 
organizations (Huth, Chadwick, Claycomb, & You, 2013). Therefore, insiders are among the 
greatest threat to the organization and insider leakage should be curbed if organizations want 
to gain competitive advantage through information sharing (Huong Tran, Childerhouse, & 
Deakins, 2016; Tan, Wong, & Chung, 2016; Zhang, Cao, Wang, & Zeng, 2012). 
This study is important because the protection of confidential data against leakage is a 
growing concern going by the leakage statistics (InfoWatch, 2016). Apparently, the traditional 
way of protection using information security policies and conventional security mechanisms 
such as firewalls, virtual private networks and intrusion detection systems continue to succumb 
to the exploits of insiders and outsiders alike (Alneyadi et al., 2016; InfoWatch 2016). 
Regrettably, these mechanisms lack proactiveness in protecting confidential data. 
We posit that the inherent complexities of the insider threat impacting information 
leakage and the integrity of information sharing call for an examination of human factors. Thus, 
the overarching goal of this research is to investigate how companies could mitigate leakage 
caused by insider attacks in information sharing. Specifically, we wish to address the following 
research questions i.e. RQ1: Why does information leakage happen? RQ2: How could 
information leakage impact information sharing integrity? RQ3: How could information 
leakage be mitigated? The findings from this study will enable managers to make better-
informed decisions to help them develop appropriate mitigation and governance strategies in 
order to maintain the consistency, accuracy and reliability information in their organizations 
(Nayar, 2004).  
The exploratory nature of this study dictated that a qualitative, multiple case study 
approach should be adopted. The study involved a total of five multinational companies 
predominantly in the manufacturing sector. Semi-structured interviews together with 
secondary data source were used to capture valuable contextual information regarding the 
history and characteristics of each case company and its information exchange process.  
Interviews with representatives of the companies were also carried out to enable the researchers 
to gain deeper insights into the mitigation strategies for leakages to achieve information sharing 
integrity. This paper will proceed as follows. In the next section of the study, we review the 
literature of human factors and information leakage. Section 3 describes the research context, 
the data collection procedure and methodology. Section 4 details the data analysis and presents 
the results. Section 5 provides the discussion. Section 6 provides the managerial implications 
and proposed framework. Lastly Section 7 concludes the study. 
2. Literature Review 
Information leakage could occur in transit, in use and at rest (Alneyadi et al, 2016; 
Orgill et al., 2004). (See Fig. 1). Employees’ actions and behaviors are especially important in 
information security as almost all information security solutions rely on the human element to 
a large degree. This could be understood from the “in use” stage where humans interface with 
the hardware such as computer terminals. The “in-use” stage interacts or connects with the “in 
transit” (cloud/internet) and also with the “at rest” where data is stored (Alneyadi et al, 2016). 
The authorized user could access the internet/intranet and database to retrieve or copy 
information, or the unauthorized user could hack into them. Some devices and channels which 
could facilitate information leakage are the laptop, fax, tablet and smartphone, email, USB and 
the printer (Olzark, 2010). Noting users at the human computer interface could extract or steal 
information and share with unauthorized recipients, the discussion on human factors will be 
first discussed followed by unintentional and intentional leakages. 
INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
2.1 Human factors  
 As described in the preceding section, in today’s information society, the use of 
information technology (IT) is designed with the human-computer interface. This facilitates 
easy access to data storage for both proper and unethical purposes. These unethical uses of IT 
are easily committed by insiders (Crossler et al., 2013) often deliberately, and with malicious 
intent posing a major security threat (Haines and Leonard, 2007; Liang and Xue, 2010). Some 
examples of insider information leakage are the theft of personally identifiable information to 
commit fraud, theft of intellectual property, or for an insider to pass sensitive or classified 
information to unauthorized third parties (Greitzer & Frincke, 2010; Huth et al., 2013). These 
thefts and leakages are intentional and malicious. Da Veiga and Eloff (2010) correctly note that 
“an organisation’s approach to information security should focus on employee [unethical] 
behavior.” Underpinning the gravity of this unethical/immoral use of computers and 
information system (Kajzer et al., 2014) is “people could be the weakest link in IS security” 
(Cheng et al., 2013). This observation “has the greatest potential for loss and damage to the 
employer” (Willison et al., 2013). Following this, the converse is that the major obstacle to 
achieve information security in an organization is insider actions and behavior when they 
handle information (Okere et al., 2012). This is verified by the results of studies which conclude 
that insiders pose a threat to information security (Da Veiga & Eloff, 2010; Omar, 2015; Rhee 
etal., 2009; Stanton et al., 2005). Intuitively, insider threats are rightly attributed to the human-
computer interface since they have authorized or unauthorized access. In addition, poor insider 
attitude and lack of awareness of security issues are also among the most significant 
contributors to security incidents (Endsley, 1995; Greitzer et al., 2014). For these, a key tool is 
to create security awareness to make insiders more aware of any significant risks lurking in the 
company enabling them to act to protect information assets (AlHogail & Mirza, 2014; Da Veiga 
& Eloff, 2010). 
Traditionally, organizations have paid considerable attention to the security of physical 
assets but largely ignored insiders who should learn appropriate and acceptable human 
behaviors for information asset security (Tseng & Fan, 2011). This ignorance could have 
humans practically failed to safeguard their companies’ information assets (InfoWatch, 2016) 
resulting in leakage scandals. One common thread in such ethical scandals is the insider ex-
post incentives offered by external parties (Tan et al., 2016). These insiders are influenced by 
competitors or other parties to intentionally act out disruptive, unethical or illegal behavior 
which compromises confidential information to achieve personal gains This particular behavior 
of leaking organization information to achieve personal gains is devious and threatens the well-
being of an organization (Omar, 2015). It is also an unethical act that violates organization 
norms, formal or informal organizational policies, rules, and procedures (Robinson & Bennett, 
1995). Therefore, ethical issues on the protection of information assets should deserve more 
attention and will constitute a major topic in information sharing (Da Veiga & Eloff, 2010).  
The issue of human factors in information leakage is crucial especially in today’s 
business digital world where information access and sharing are unavoidable in daily activities. 
Unfortunately, organizations are still not absolutely clear about human factors triggering 
intentional and unintentional leakage causing information sharing interruptions (disruptions) 
as there is sparse research in human factors. Some psychosocial indicators that are considered 
indications that an individual is a potentially malicious insider are disgruntlement, disagreeing 
with feedback, anger, disengagement, disregard for authority and performance issues (Greitzer 
& Frincke, 2010). In addition, information leakage could also refer to inadvertent information 
loss when forgetting to change password, failing to log off before leaving workplace, or 
carelessly discarding sensitive information rather than shredding it (McCormick, 2008; 
Warkentin & Willison, 2009). Oddly, information leakages may benefit some business 
operations. For instance, firms allow for voluntary information spillovers regarding an 
innovative product or process in order to accelerate the arrival date of the new inventions 
(Harhoff et al., 2003). Although information leakage or spillover may benefit from the increase 
in diffusion via a number of effects, leaked proprietary information may well flow outside the 
borders of any organizations in an uncontrollable, unwanted, and even harmful manner (Ritala 
et al., 2015) to allow competitors to similarly introduce their new products. 
Regardless of the leakage type and motivation, the impact of these insider actions could 
precipitate in financial loss, disruption to the organization, loss of reputation, and long-term 
impact on organizational culture. Therefore, any impact may not depend on motivation because 
an innocent act of unintentional leakage can have as devastating an effect as a maliciously 
motivated attack (Hunker & Probst, 2011). The goal may therefore be to avoid catastrophic 
consequences regardless of the motivation (Hunker & Probst, 2011). With information leakage 
bringing more harm than good, it is counterproductive work behavior (Marcus et al., 2016) and 
could be dealt with mitigation techniques (Hunker & Probst, 2011). 
Today, insiders who want to leak confidential or proprietary information may not need 
a great deal of specific knowledge of the information. Gigabytes or more of information can 
be exfiltrated or duplicated using various means including email, instant messaging, thumb 
drives and other modern information technology tools (Greitzer & Hohimer, 2011). Indeed, the 
only way to be proactive is analysis of insider behavior in order to recognize signs and 
precursors of the potential insider threat activity (Greitzer & Frincke, 2010). This is often 
evident in behavior prior to execution of the crime. However, sometimes it can be difficult to 
separate “acceptable” insider behavior from “unacceptable” behavior (Hunker & Probst, 2011). 
Recognizing insider threats as human behavior deviance is an important starting point 
to control information leakages in addition to existing technical measures. The insider threat is 
revealed when human behaviors deviate from compliance with established policies or normal 
standards of conduct regardless of whether they are caused by ignorance, malice or disregard 
(Greitzer & Hohimer, 2011; Greitzer et al., 2008). Broadly, the act of leaking information is 
classified as an undesirable behavior by employees who share information for whatever reason 
which a company would rather protect (Ritala et al., 2015). Human behavior can wreak havoc 
on information sharing through intentional or unintentional abuse in the information sharing 
process because it could cause loss of information value to both the giving and recipient 
company in the supply chain information sharing. Identifying human factors of insider threats 
is thus necessary to mitigate information leakage. Therefore, it is timely for academics and 
managers to search for appropriate mitigation strategies to reduce information leakage effects 
in order to attain information sharing integrity. 
2.2 Intentional leakage 
A general overview of intentional leakage (IL) is a negative and deviant workplace 
behavior (Dimotakis et al., 2008; Robinson & Bennett, 1995) and is counterproductive to 
desired work behaviour (Gruys & Sackett, 2003). Intentional implies premeditated, conscious 
and willful decision of an insider to harm the business operations of a company (Guo et al., 
2011) while leakage connotes the prohibition of revealing critical information to an 
unauthorized entity (Ritala et al., 2015; Tan et al., 2016). Such occurrences stem from different 
motivations as described in the preceding section. This could happen when insiders are offered 
incentives to do so (i.e., to leak the organization’s confidential information for pecuniary 
interests) or it could be a personal vendetta against the company (Nishat Faisal et al., 2007). 
Other reasons include “innocent action”, “fun”, “technical challenge”, “criminal intentions”, 
and “espionage”, or a combination of each of these factors. (Hunker & Probst, 2011). 
In behavioral psychology, the outcome from the act of malicious insider who exploits 
information for personal gains is intentional leakage (Warkentin & Willison, 2009). For 
instance, an insider primarily motivated by personal financial gain could intentionally disclose 
confidential information or misuse authorized access to steal and sell data (Cappelli et al., 
2009). This behavior of malicious insiders in leaking information intentionally could be 
explained by the theory of human behaviorism (Nurse et al., 2014).  This theory explains 
incentives could be internal (intrinsic) or external (extrinsic) and drive the pattern of human 
motivations. Intrinsic factor (e.g. employer’s recognition) can motivate employees to exhibit 
good conduct during work but if the extrinsic factor (e.g. money and non-financial incentives 
offered by competitors and outsiders) overwhelms the effect of intrinsic, then it will cause 
behavioral change of insiders. The overpowering extrinsic factors would lure insiders to 
consciously violate organization norms and tend to commit evil acts to threaten the well-being 
of an organization (Sackett and DeVore, 2001). These evil acts cover a broad range of discrete 
activities e.g. (1) theft, (2) destruction of property, (3) misuse of information, (4) unethical 
decision making, and (5) workplace retaliation (Warkentin & Willison, 2009; Marcus et al., 
2016). This explains external incentives could cause insiders to leak information when given 
sufficient financial and nonfinancial rewards. 
Noting the above, the risks or danger signals associated with insiders who are threats to 
organization to leak information should be closely monitored and addressed. The risks from 
intentional human (malicious insiders) activity are especially dangerous to confidential 
information assets of organization (Hunker & Probst, 2011; Omar, 2015). This is because a 
malicious insider has the potential to cause more damage to company information 
infrastructures (Cappelli et al., 2012). Malicious insiders are trusted agents who have legitimate 
and privileged access to facilities and resources, and possess SWOT (strengths, weaknesses, 
opportunities and threats) knowledge of the organization and its processes and know the 
location of critical or valuable information assets. This knowledge empowers insiders how, 
when and where to attack and cover their trails (Colwill, 2009; Hoecht & Trott, 2006; 
Warkentin & Willison, 2009; Huth et al., 2013). Hence, armed with ample opportunities, they 
can exploit their positions to steal information and leak them to an unauthorized third party 
making these insiders worrisome liabilities to the organizations (Hoecht & Trott, 2006) which 
could cause their organizations to lose competitive advantage.  
Intentional leakage cause by frustration, personal vendetta, dislike of authority and 
inclination for revenge (Moore et al., 2009; Colwill, 2009) could also explain their effects 
which produce disequilibrium in human behaviorism. The unamicable situations in the work 
environment would infuse a negative driving force (disincentives) to the insiders and caused 
them to behave in a negative way. Engulfed with feelings of unhappiness, unfairness and 
resentment in their job, these tipping points would invoke a change in psychological state and 
attitudes to trigger attacks on selected assets and purposefully exposing critical business 
information to outsiders, third parties or new companies (Nurse et al., 2014).  All these actions 
by the malicious insiders for specific purposes by disclosing confidential information would 
seriously impact the competitiveness of the organization, and their dishonesty in information 
sharing would cause harm to various parties in the supply chain network because of 
disadvantage in information asymmetry. 
 
2.3 Unintentional leakage 
The term “unintentional” in this study implies “accidentally”. Unintentional leakage 
occurs when an insider accidentally exposes critical business information not meant to be 
shared with third parties (Ritala et al., 2015; Tan et al., 2016). The accidental insider threat is 
the potential of an individual who has or had authorized access to an organization’s network, 
system, or data through action or inaction, without malicious intent, causes harm or 
substantially increases the probability of future serious harm to the confidentiality, integrity, or 
value of the organization’s information (Cappelli et al. 2012; Greitzer et al. 2014a; Greitzer et 
al., 2014b). Generally, the accidental insider which is inevitable in an organization is often the 
effect or symptom of deeper troubles (Bureau, 2013).  
Most of the accidental insider threats, especially jobs which require protecting 
privileged information (sensitive, proprietary, or classified) pointed out human failures or 
errors could lead to an information breach or data loss (Liginlal et al., 2009 ; Greitzer et al., 
2014). Errors could also occur in misperceptions and from a lack of awareness (Bureau, 2013). 
Such poor cognitive behavior is a method instigating undesirable behavior of unintentional 
leakage (Sonderegger, 2007). In normal circumstances, information is attended, comprehended, 
and aligned with the person’s attitudes, beliefs, and motivations, after which decision-making 
processes produce behavioral responses (Bureau, 2013). However, the cognitive processes of 
perception, attention, comprehension, judgment/decision making could produce erroneous 
actions and behaviors (Bureau, 2013). In other words, poor cognitive process could have 
employees inadvertently or consciously make decisions to act inappropriately or unfavorably 
to their companies. 
 The unintentional information leakage could occur when employees are unclear about 
what they could actually disclose to business partners (Molok et al., 2010). Accidental insider 
threat correlates to poor situation awareness rather than to poor decision making, though 
decision making requires situation awareness (Endsley, 1995). Sometimes the over-enthusiasm 
about a new idea or innovative prospect could cause momentary negligence of protection 
responsibility when the other party is perceived as trustworthy (Greitzer et al., 2014a). To that 
end, professional pride could affect eagerness and willingness to share information, as could 
curiosity and passion (Fawcett et al, 2007). Incorrect or incomplete situation awareness at any 
given time may result in human error that causes unintentional leakage, potentially increasing 
organizational risk (Greitzer et al., 2014a).  
 The accidental insider has a history of causing information breaches as revealed in the 
examples above. The information unintentional leakage as an incident is merely a function of 
the insider’s negligence. But egregious to a fault, accidental insider threat in disclosure of 
information can damage an organization’s reputation and perhaps make it liable to pay damages 
to the injured party.  
In sum, this section describes the human misbehaviors and perceptual weakness on 
intentional and unintentional leakages respectively. Intentional leakage is associated with 
malicious insider misbehavior while unintentional leakage is related to accidental insiders and 
their perception weakness. These are perennial problems showing an ever worsening and 
persistent research gap of which closure is elusive. These intentional and unintentional do not 
seem to decrease and on the contrary, they increase from year to year (InfoWatch, 2016). The 
colossal financial losses attributed to both intentional and unintentional leakage deserve the 
attention of researchers especially when new and patches of technological defenses have failed 
(InfoWatch, 2016; Alneyadi et al., 2016). The next section will describe the research context, 
the data collection procedure and methodology. Noting the serious consequences and liabilities 
of human misbehaviour and weaknesses, the intentional and unintentional leakage, and the 
sparse research on human factors and leakage, this research is devoted to lay further 
groundwork to address leakages from the human perspective especially with the vulnerabilities 
at the human-computer interface. 
 
3. Research Methodology  
The infancy of information leakage on information sharing integrity research calls for 
an exploratory study (Saunders et al., 2009; Creswell, 2014). Qualitative research is primarily 
exploratory research. It provides the complex textual descriptions of how people experience 
the issue or problem under study (Mack yet al., 2005).  
In order to have a better understanding of the concept of information leakage and how 
information leakage could impact information sharing integrity, it is necessary to look at the 
organization and its information exchange process. This study chooses to use case study 
approach because it aims at answering questions like “How” as well as the “Why”, and to 
generate an in-depth, multi-faceted understanding of a complex phenomenon between 
information leakage and information sharing integrity in its real-life context (Yin, 2013). 
Besides, the use of case study approach can explore unknown variables in the phenomenon 
which is not fully understood yet (Voss et al., 2002) such as information leakage. Hence, the 
multiple-cases through holistic design of Yin (2013) is adopted to explore managerial 
approaches in mitigating the impact of intentional and unintentional leakage on information 
sharing integrity. The holistic cases in this study refer to the Malaysia Multinational Enterprise 
(MNE)/ Multinational Corporations (MNCs). 
Section 3.1 describes the research context before section 3.2 justifies the case study 
approach and method; followed by section 3.3 which outlines the process of data collection.   
 
3.1 Research Context 
In Malaysia, the number of Multinational Enterprises (MNEs)/ Multinational 
Corporations (MNCs) has grown tremendously due to Malaysia’s geographical location in the 
region, multilingual capabilities and abundance skill workers (Economic Transformation 
Programme, 2016). According to the World Investment Prospects Survey 2014-2016 FDI by 
the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), Malaysia ranks as 
among the world's top 15 attractive countries for foreign direct investment (FDI).  
 Malaysia is strategically located in the heart of South East Asia and offers a cost-
competitive location for investor (MDBC, 2017). In this developing country with well-
developed infrastructure, productive workforce, technological advancement, it also provides 
attractive incentives for investors (MIDA, 2017). As a result of perceptive foresight, Malaysia 
has a strong economic fundamental to attract foreign investors. The Star Online (2017) reported 
that Malaysia’s 2017 full year gross domestic product (GDP) forecast to 5.3% which is higher 
than the GDP of 4.2% the year before. Factors that will drive economic growth for Malaysia 
include exports and private consumption (Ministry of Finance Malaysia, 2016). Moreover, 
Malaysian’s inflation rate (CPI) was 2.1% is considered low and unemployment rate was 3.4% 
in 2016 (MIDA, 2017).    
Furthermore, Malaysia has simple, transparent rules for registering a business, paying 
taxes earlier by introducing an online system for filling and paying goods and services tax 
(GST), getting credit to provide investors credit scores and registering property helps create a 
level playing field for doing business (The World Bank, 2017). According to its “Doing 
Business 2017” report, Malaysia is ranked 23 amongst 190 countries in the ease of doing 
business (The World Bank, 2017). Therefore, Malaysia is a business-friendly place that 
provides MNEs/MNCs with opportunities for growth and profits. 
In recent years, leakages of confidential information in Multinational Enterprises 
(MNEs)/ Multinational Corporations (MNCs) have generated a great deal of discussion due to 
its severity which could harm the business environment (InfoWatch, 2016). The Global Data 
Leakage Report 2016 by InfoWatch presents the latest issue of information leakage in 2016. 
There were 1,556 leaks of confidential information reported and was worse than the same 
period the year before (InfoWatch, 2016). Among the data leaks logged, 38.2% of the cases 
were triggered by external attacks, while 61.8% were caused by internal offenders (InfoWatch, 
2016). The Star Online (2016) reported that a total of 9,915 incidents were received by 
CyberSecurity Malaysia in 2015. Based on the current trend and scenario, this figure does not 
include data breaches and records disclosed incidents that go unreported every day. All these 
incidents aimed at leaking confidential business information, disrupted critical operations, and 
jeopardised the Malaysian economy (The Star Online, 2016). 
For the above reasons, much global attention is now focused on the need to mitigate 
information leakage in Multinational Enterprise (MNE)/ Multinational Corporation (MNC) of 
Malaysia. The Malaysia MNE/MNC therefore provides a rich and appropriate setting for 
exploring our research questions.   
 
3.2 Multiple Case Study Approach  
Multiple–case designs have increased in frequency in recent years (Yin, 2013). When 
exploring new areas, multiple-case study can augment external validity, guard against observer 
bias (Voss et al., 2002; Barratt et al., 2011), and the results obtained can improve generality 
(Voss et al., 2002; Yin, 2009). It also could create more robust and testable theories than those 
based on single case (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007; Yin, 2009). 
The multiple-cases, holistic design is deemed appropriate because the selected cases 
are conceived as “replication logic” design (Yin, 2013). This replication logic used in multiple-
case studies is similar to the multiple experiments (Yin, 2013). In this study, five cases of 
Malaysia Multinational Enterprise (MNE)/ Multinational Corporation (MNC) were examined.  
The selection of these companies was based on: (i) their MNEs/MNCs status, (ii) a physical 
presence (facilities and other assets) in the host country, and (iii) their practical understanding 
of the concept of information leakage. Each MNE/MNC case study must be carefully selected 
to predict similar results (literal replication) or predict contrasting results (theoretical 
replication) (Mills et al., 2010; Yin, 2013). In fact, the replications attempt to duplicate the 
exact MNE/MNC conditions of insider intentional leakage and unintentional leakage of 
confidential information to unauthorised parties and how MNE/MNC mitigate information 
leakage in order to achieve information sharing integrity. Therefore, overall evidences from 
multiple cases are sought regarding the information leakage impact upon information sharing 
integrity and are considered robust (Herriott & Firestone, 1983; Yin, 2009; Yin, 2013).  
Before proceeding with data collection, all companies selected for this study must meet 
the following criteria: (i) companies are Multinational Enterprise (MNE) or Multinational 
Corporation (MNC), (ii) companies have a physical presence in Malaysia, i.e. has facilities and 
other assets, and (iii) companies must well understand the concept of information leakage.  
 
3.3 Data Collection  
The companies which fulfilled all the above criteria were chosen from the Business 
Monitor International (BMI, 2017). The BMI provides online access to a large and rich 
database of Multinational Companies in emerging markets. The primary mode of data 
collection was interviewing; other methods employed included collecting printed documents.  
In total, five semi-structured interviews were conducted to gather managerial 
approaches in mitigating the impact of information leakage in information sharing integrity. 
Semi-structured interviews can be very helpful in an exploratory study (Saunders et al., 2009). 
Besides, semi-structured interview is generally organised around a set of predetermined open-
ended questions, with other questions emerging from the dialogue between interviewer and 
interviewee (DiCicco-Bloom & Crabtree, 2006).  In this research, the interview questions were 
conducted on a one-to-one basis, between interviewee and interviewer, and took between 30 
minutes to several hours to complete. All interviews were recorded and transcribed.  By the 
end of the fifth interview, the incremental value added per interview was minimal and we were 
arguably approaching saturation. 
In addition to the face-to-face interviews, the interviewer collected printed documents 
to supplement the information obtained from the five MNC/MNEs. These documents ranged 
from confidential documents (personal journals and diaries, letters, and e-mails) and public 
documents (company’s brochure, catalogues, newspapers, and official reports) to other 
publicly available information (Creswell, 2014). The documents related to information sharing 
processes, policies and procedures of a company and performance improvements. 
An overview of the companies and interviewees is provided in Table 1. The five 
MNC/MNEs are referred to as Company A, B, C, D and E. The data collection procedure is 
described in the following section.  
 
3.3.1 Data Collection Procedure 
The in-depth interviews were conducted in February 2017. In all five cases, 
appointments by email were made before visiting the companies. To ensure the interviewee 
has a clear understanding and could answer some questions, an introduction of research project 
together with the definition of information leakage and threats businesses face today were made. 
Besides, this offered the interviewee sufficient time to organize the relevant documents before 
interview session. A one-day site visit to each company was arranged with the duration of each 
semi-structured interview ranging from 45 minutes to 96 minutes with key interviewee. Finally, 
a chance to review documents related to information sharing processes, policies, company 
procedures and performance improvements before the end of the visit.  During the interview, 
information was recorded by taking down notes and audiotaping. The interview protocol 
included the following: 
1. Set the heading (date, place, interviewer, interviewee) 
2. Prepare a short introduction for interviewee at the beginning, followed by questions and 
concluding statement. 
3. When interviewee remains unduly silent, we explain their ideas in greater detail and 
discuss what they have said to help them express their ideas. 
4. The lapses between the questions are meant to record responses 
5. A final thank-you statement to acknowledge the time the interviewee spent during the 
interview.  
The interview questions are provided in Appendix 1. Data and information collected from five 
cases are kept confidential at all times. To increase the truth-value of the study, one additional 
step was taken. The transcriptions and the summary of each interview were sent back to the 
respective interviewees for congruency with the information provided. The interviewees were 
given sufficient time to review and amend the contents. Any transcription discrepancy is 
resolved by seeking further advice from the relevant interviewee. This method was also used 
by Da Mota Pedrosa et al., (2012).  
 
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
4. Data Analysis 
With the aim of exploring managerial approaches in mitigating the impact of insider 
threat towards information leakage on information sharing integrity, the analysis thus involved 
codification of the interview transcripts to allow for qualitative analysis. All responses were 
imported into MAXQDA 12.0 software for coding, count and analysis.  
  During the analysis, a three-step qualitative data analysis was used (Miles & 
Huberman, 1994). First step involved the researcher reviewing the transcripts for accuracy and 
generating coding categories. The second step arranged codes similar category or theme into a 
cluster. In the final stage of the analysis, the findings were discussed, confirmed and reflected 
upon with key interviewees of the case companies where information leakage was studied.  
To confirm the conclusion of the study and ensure validity, it is important to be aware 
of potential biases when analysing case study data. Most prominently is the potential that 
interviewees would play down their degree of information leakage throughout their companies 
in a positive light to protect their reputation. Generally, potential biases when analysing case 
study data do not appear in this study. This is because, when we explain information leakage 
to the interviewees, we portray leakage in a neutral state. For instance, we mentioned that 
information leakage is like know-how trading, is needed for technology transfer and the 
direction of its effect would depend on competition, exclusivity and instrumentality of the 
relationship (Schrader, 1989). As such, the interviewees were generally open about their 
shortcomings and potential biases were avoided.  
4.1 Coding, calculation and analysis 
The responses from the interviews were then imported into MAXQDA 12.0 software, 
a digital tool for qualitative analysis (Paulus, Lester & Dempster, 2014) to be coded, counted 
and analyzed.  
 
4.1.1 MAXQDA’s Code Matrix Browser 
Figure 2 shows MAXQDA’s Code Matrix Browser providing visualization of how 
often these five case companies’ documents have been assigned specific codes. The matrix 
provides an overview of Company A, B, C, D, and E on x-axis, and specific codes (code 
system) on y-axis. The size of the symbol indicates how often the code has been used in a 
particular document of the company. The extreme right-hand column reports the number of 
segments of text codified for each code. The total number of coded segments assigned and 
retrieved is 112. The most frequently applied code is “Organizational Ethical Climate” with 36 
segments codified. The second most frequent code appearing is “Information Security Culture” 
with 32 segments. These were followed by “Information Leakage” with 8 segments. Therefore, 
the analysis shows that the organizational ethical climate and information security culture are 
often seen as countermeasures for the information leakage.  
 
INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
4.1.2 Conceptual Maps 
MAXMaps tool combines analysis of study turning into conceptual maps. The last step 
of analysis in this study is to turn ideas and results into conceptual maps. MAXMaps tool is 
used for this, which has customized, standardized and pre-programmed visualizations (Paulus 
et al., 2014). The first is a standardized visualization for the category "Managerial 
Approaches." The second is a user-created conceptual model of “Information Leakage and 
Consequences." Figure 3 was created with the "Code-Subcode Model". The code of 
“organizational ethical climate” and “information security culture” were selected and the model 
automatically created. It shows the subcodes arranged around the selected code in the down 
and up coded segments. Each of the sub-codes is a managerial approach mentioned in the data 
set to mitigate the negative impacts of intentional leakage and unintentional leakage. All results 
were gathered into a conceptual map that brought together the causes (intentional leakage and 
unintentional leakage), consequences and managerial approaches in mitigating the impact of 
information leakage.  
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5. Discussions 
From the interviews, Malaysia Multinational Enterprises/ Multinational Corporations 
(MNEs/MNCs) A, B, C, D and E revealed that information leakage occurred in their companies.  
We will now relate the findings to our research questions. 
5.1 Why information leakage happens? 
Earlier studies emphasize that information sharing has clear benefits but poses risk of 
information leakage that organizations must be aware of (Anand & Goyal, 2009; Lee & Whang, 
2000; Li, 2002; Sharma & Routroy, 2016; Zhang et al., 2011; Zhang et al., 2012). In this study, 
we empirically identified the factors triggering information leakage and managerial approaches 
in mitigating negative consequences to achieve successful information integrity. 
Our findings confirmed that leakage happens due to human factors. Human factors are 
the major challenge as company A, B, C, D, and E face information leakage either intentional 
or unintentional. Intentional leakage happened in the company due to personal greed other than 
organization benefit in which employees are willing to take risk over value of personal 
obsession, like what were mentioned by Company B and E. Besides, Company A employee’s 
jealousy with others, disgruntled with company or feeling vindictive for any reasons also 
caused intentional leakage. Moreover, Company C and D faced malicious hackers who 
breached company’s valuable information due to insufficient data protection Acts. Hence, all 
intentional human behaviors are unethical action to harm the security and business operations. 
These findings are consistent with past studies of insider threat (employees/malicious insider 
– associated with behavioural aspects of human) is the core factor that leads to information 
intentional leakage in an organization (Colwill, 2009; Mohamed et al., 2006; Warkentin & 
Willison, 2009). 
In contrast, unintentional leakage happened due to negligent employees having 
breached their duty to protect, and accidentally leaking the valuable information to external 
parties, like what happened in Company B and C. Sometimes, employee’s over-enthusiasm 
about a new idea and the company failed to educate employees about risky behaviors (like 
Company D) could also accidentally leaked information. In Company D, new employees’ 
unintentional disclosure of valuable information due to employees being unclear about what 
they could actually disclose to partners.  Thus, human error is a significant source that may 
damage or destroy information assets. These findings are also consistent with past studies of 
human error (employees/accidental insider – associated with lack of awareness) which revealed 
more information to authorized parties accidentally and is the core factor that leads to 
information unintentional leakage in an organization (Mohamed et al., 2006; Molok et al, 2010; 
Tan et al., 2016) 
As such, the human factors that trigger information leakages can be summarized in 
Figure 4 below.  
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5.2 How information leakage could impact information sharing integrity? 
Every respondent (Company A-E) acknowledged that information leakage is critical 
because information of the company is lost or leaked to external parties either intentional or 
unintentional. The critical information disclosed may flow outside organizational borders in an 
uncontrollable, unwanted and harmful manner. This finding synchronizes with the findings 
from Ahmad et al., (2015) which shows the powerful impact of information leakage has 
devastating consequences on an organization. Any information shared or received that is unable 
to achieve real time transmission (in other words, leakage occurring in the transmission) will 
affect the overall efficiency and decapitate the process.  
The interviewees proposed that information leakage causes one of the biggest threats 
to damage the companies. For example, Company A pointed out that disgruntled employees 
may intentionally leaked critical information to unauthorized parties. The unauthorized parties 
acknowledged the value of information to enhance their competency and mutually generate 
new idea from the leaked information received. Similarly, Company B discovered the 
employee purposely breached confidential information to third parties for personal benefits. 
The threat of third parties could imitate a new innovation with little incentive to invest in R&D 
and innovation. It can be concluded that intentional leakage caused unauthorized parties gain 
as much innovation benefits, but companies involved have been awarded damages for loss of 
much higher quality information in the market. This is the two-edge sword of information 
intentional leakage, benefiting one end and risking the other end.  
Although the growing significance of information sharing practices is good for 
organizations competitiveness and market performance, information leakage makes it difficult 
to achieve the goals and deliver a positive return on investment. Purchasing executive of 
Company D recounted that: 
“The impact of information leakage is unexpected and out of control in the company. 
Our company was over-enthusiastic about a new idea to achieve its mission, values and goals 
but failed to educate employees about risky behaviours that could unintentionally leak data 
and information. Therefore, our company had to invest huge resources developing security 
policies in order to mitigate information leakage. This is the only way to achieve its goals and 
deliver higher return”. 
In the meanwhile, Company E admitted that information leakage led to lack of trust 
with partners. Hence, partners are unwilling to share information due to disclosure of any 
confidential information without partner’s consent. Therefore, information sharing 
collaboration is difficult to accomplish and facilitate information sharing for maximum 
efficiency and effectiveness.  
“Our company faced up supplier’s information was leaked to third parties. The trust 
among suppliers was broken and the reputation is ruined’ - Project program analyst of 
Company E 
Moreover, Company D revealed that information leakage is a risk undermining the 
effectiveness of information sharing. Through the information sharing process, information 
sent or received should not be manifested or else accuracy and mutual expectation on 
information would not be achieved as the information shared can be considered useless in an 
organization. In other words, the loss of usefulness or value of the leaked information damages 
the integrity of information sharing.  
As such, with the above negative outcomes, intentional leakage and unintentional 
leakage would cause information sharing disruption in an organization. In other words, leakage 
negatively affects information sharing integrity and this was concluded by the firms in this 
study. Firms that encounter higher frequency of leakages will cause negative impact to their 
information sharing integrity. Hence, appropriate measures are required to mitigate the effects 
of information leakages on information sharing integrity.  
 
5.3 How information leakage can be mitigated? 
The analysis of the results showed that there were several approaches/strategies to risk 
(information leakage) reduction measures reported by the case companies. These mitigation 
strategies are human governance measures that could be categorized as fostering organizational 
ethical climate and information security culture.  Human governance refers to human beings 
guided by a common set of principles inherent in every human being; these unwritten principles 
are built into each and every human irrespective of colour or creed, to help human differentiate 
between right and wrong and how to treat each fellow human being (Salleh, 2016).  
Human governance encompasses ethics and culture because through its practice, it acts 
as a moral compass which can eventually bring out integrity which is a symbol of inner state 
of values. Human internal character needs to be nurtured in order to encourage integrity. 
Organizational ethical climate (OEC) reflects the shared perceptions held by employees 
regarding the organization's norms, policies, practices and procedures (Nedkovski, Guerci, De 
Battisti, & Siletti, 2017). Organizational ethical climate facilitates ethical behaviour in 
organizations in response to ethical dilemma especially caused by employees. On the other 
hand, information security culture reflects the way of doing things around the information 
security, including creation of an environment that fosters and nurtures shared security basic 
assumption, attitudes and beliefs, value and knowledge in a given organization (Schlienger & 
Teufel, 2002; Da Veiga & Martins, 2015). Information security culture shapes employee’s 
attitude and behaviours towards information security in the long run (Chen et al., 2015). 
 
a) Organizational Ethical Climate (OEC) 
The case companies relied on organizational ethical climate as shared perception on 
what correct behavior is and how ethical situations should be handled in an organization.  This 
synchronizes with the notion of OEC in literature of Victor & Cullen (1987, 1988). Ethical 
climate influences both the decision-making and subsequent behaviour in response to ethical 
dilemmas (Hsieh & Wang, 2016; Martin & Cullen, 2006; Simha & Cullen, 2012). Victor et al. 
(1988) highlighted that there are five types of ethical climate that exist in companies in order 
to mitigate employees deliberate disclosure of confidential information to unauthorized parties. 
Our findings reveal that the facilitation of ethical behavior in each case company differs from 
one another. The reason is the companies have different locus analysis of ethical climate. As 
such, in the following section, we discuss the mapping of our interview findings with the ethical 
climate-locus of analysis. For clarity, the types of ethical climate and the division of the 
analysis locus will be based on Victor et al. (1988) as shown in Figure 5. 
 




Leakage of critical information usually occurs through employee personal greed rather bringing 
benefits to the organization. To prevent unethical employees breaching confidential 
information intentionally in a company, instrumental ethical climate might be legitimized by 
the self-interest behavior prevalent in workplace. Likewise, the decision has been made that 
takes everyone’s interests into account to serve the company’s interests. Employee’s prime 
purpose is to ultimately serve their self-interest, also it is his sense of obligation to others. For 
example, Companies E offer progressive reward systems which motivated employees to work 
at higher levels of productivity in order to be more effective to achieve its goals in long term 
future.   
 
   
Caring 
 
Employee’s jealousy of others or feeling vindictive for any reasons also caused intentional 
leakage in an organization. In the high-profile data breaches that frequently damages a 
company’s reputation and profits, caring ethical climate is one of the most desired climate by 
employees. Individuals perceive that decisions should be based on an overarching concern for 
the well-being of others in organization. The general manager of Company A suggested that 
creation of a great working environment that makes employees feel a part of it can mitigate 
employee’s jealousy or feeling vindictive of others. Therefore, employees are willing to put 
much time and energy into the job and hard work generates loyalty. For these reasons human 





The employee is guided by their own personal ethics in an organization. The most important 
concern is each person’s perception of information leakage is unique and different from one 
another. The general manager of company A explained that many of the employees believe 
that even though they had intentionally leak information for personal gain, they can still get 
away from disciplinary action. To mitigate the leakage of information in workplace, employees 
must have high personal moral value with minimal regard for external forces or outside 
influence on ethical quandaries. Independence ethical climate sometimes is suitable in this case 
(e.g., for company A). The decisions are made based on careful consideration by the employees 




The analysis of the results from the Company A, C and D saw strict policies and procedures in 
place that prohibit employees from communicating critical information to unauthorized parties. 
In the rules ethics climate, organizational decisions are perceived as being guided by a strong 
and pervasive set of policies and procedures. Employees follow operating practices under strict 
organization policies and procedures. The chances are likely that these rules will be followed 
by everyone in the organization. The rules ensured all employees are doing the right thing to 
prevent outrageous workplace behaviour. These policies and procedures are to assist 
employees in understanding the difference between “Right” and “Wrong” to prevent unethical 
behaviour. Respondents emphasised that to reduce the risk of intentional leakage, employees 
act in an ethical manner guided by the organisational policies and procedures.  
 
Law and Code 
The continued effort to strengthen law and ethical code climates, the case companies are 
responsible for interpreting confidentiality restrictions imposed by laws and statutes to all 
levels of employee. For example, human resource officer from Company C revealed that they 
implemented “Criminal Code” to prevent employees or former employees from leaking 
confidential information to unauthorized parties. Besides, the company has a comprehensive 
code of conduct which can provide extra protection for information assets and can serve to 
keep out legal trouble. Hence, employees are expected to strictly follow legal or professional 
standards especially decision maker who must take into account all relevant considerations 
before action.  
 
b) Information Security Culture  
Our findings also reveal another important mitigation approach i.e. information security 
culture. Participants in this research reported that information breaches are often caused by 
employees’ negligence or ignorance of information sharing, resulting in large financial losses 
for organizations. The case companies asserted that information security culture will minimize 
unintentional leakage. This finding echoes the same tune as Al Hogail & ALHogail (2015).  
Through information security culture, appropriate information security beliefs and values that 
guide employee behaviour will be constructed when interacting with information assets and 
information technology systems. Hence, this helps minimize unintentional leakage. 
Several of the case companies stated that information security policies and procedures 
are to protect the confidentiality, integrity and availability of the information assets.  For 
instance, Company A developed an information classification to limit access information and 
facilitate more efficient information exchange activities. Information classification would 
classify information into three confidential levels (confidential, restricted and internal use) and 
public level. Based on the information confidential levels, employees have comprehensive 
good practice guidance about the appropriate information that can be shared.  
Another example of information security culture is the setting up of an information 
access policy, which is allowing only limited number of persons to access such information in 
the company. Company C creates and enforces a strict access policy could easily monitor the 
activities of these employees and make use of information effectively. For example, User 
Activity Monitoring was used by Company C to deter user access to the files and track in detail 
any privileged user activity. An automated screen locks down after unauthorized user accessed 
the network. This system appears to be useful to tackle network vulnerability that enhance 
processing, transmission and storage information to authorized users.  
Moreover, Company D also recommended enforcement of strong password policy to 
enhance safeguard of company devices. The company creates and enforces strong password 
policy to enhance its computer security. Passwords provide strong protection against 
employees who are not as knowledgeable about proper business information security 
precautions. The respondent from Company D further reiterated that in fact, secret passwords 
have always been used for validating user identity. Therefore, Company D emphasizes 
password setting on specific document as a safeguard device to prevent information leakage.  
In addition, fostering information security culture through sufficient training and proper 
education are also important to inoculate such security consciousness at all levels of employees. 
The case companies mentioned that it is important to understand the types of risk behaviours 
associated and make it as simple as possible through education, training and awareness 
programs. Besides, companies must ensure employees participation in relevant programs to 
keep abreast with information security. It is good enough to provide a security checklist to 
guide employees follow policies and procedures. All these programs assist organizations in 
creating and sustaining a security conscious culture to mitigate unintentional leakage.   
In sum, clear expectations of appropriate behaviours of employees need to be 
thoroughly embedded in information security control.  Information security culture increased 
awareness of unintentional leakage issues and reinforces an implicit adherence to security 
conduct. 
 
6. Managerial Implications and Proposed Framework 
The findings from this study give valuable managerial implications. Firstly, the findings 
imply that managers of companies must be aware of the key factors of human misbehaviour 
and perceptual weaknesses could trigger information leakage. The human factor plays a very 
important role in information sharing, especially, when companies have weak internal controls. 
By engaging in information sharing, companies increase the risk that confidential information 
might be intentionally or unintentionally leaked to unauthorized parties. Risks from human 
activities are dangerous to information assets, especially from those who are within the 
organization i.e. the insiders. This is because insiders will know how, when and where to attack 
and how to cover their tracks. Intentional leakage is caused by malicious insiders with 
intentional behavior to leak information. Unintentional leakage is caused by accidental insiders 
who do not have intention to leak information but have acted inappropriately due to perceptual 
errors.  
The second implication is managers of companies need to be aware of the harmful 
effects of information leakage that can seriously affect information sharing integrity. The 
critical information disclosed may flow outside organizational borders in an uncontrolled 
manner resulting in loss of information value. Thus, intentional and unintentional leakages by 
insiders would disrupt information sharing in an organization. It is imperative for managers to 
be cognizant and mindful of insiders threat. Hence, to overcome information leakage by 
insiders, mitigation on human factors need to be undertaken by managers. Human factors 
should be examined in the context of governance (hard and soft measures) in information 
sharing.  
Interestingly, our findings imply managers and practitioners should foster 
organizational ethical climate and information security culture because they are useful to 
promote diffusion of central norms and values which can lead to an increased collective 
awareness of leakage issues. This corresponds to the hard and soft measures of human 
governance. Foremost, companies can benefit by establishing this coherent human governance 
structure i.e. ethical climate and information security culture, as these indirectly contribute to 
information sharing integrity by means of mitigating intentional and unintentional leakages.  
These governance measures are imperative for managers and practitioners to combat 
leakage issues. To address intentional leakage, we advocate managers to foster organizational 
ethical climate to shape and guide employees’ acceptable behaviour. This is because only 
through these collective ethical norms, employees’ purposeful disclosure of sensitive 
information can be countered.  For example, managers can create a great working environment 
(caring ethics), offer progressive reward system (instrumental ethics), have strict policies and 
procedures (rules ethics) and implement criminal code (law and code ethics) to foster 
conducive organizational ethical climate to nurture employees’ behaviour. On the other hand, 
we advocate managers to implement an information security culture e.g. setup information 
access and password policies to safeguard information assets from accidental loss through 
unexpected system failure or human error. Companies can also organize frequent training and 
education to instil information security conscious in all levels of employees.  
Noting the above, societies at large could benefit from employees who would inculcate 
or spill over good organizational ethical culture to influence their private homes. Good ethical 
influences in homes could multiply to schools by school going children or to workplaces by 
family members who work in other organizations. Slowly but surely, a pervasive ethical 
climate would gain a foothold in daily lives making ethical behaviour second nature. Good 
ethics should promote a society which is clean from corruption. 
Even information security culture could rub onto family members who would also bring 
this culture to their workplace. The conscious decision to maintain an information secure work 
environment augurs well for personal data protection similar to the hard measure of personal 
safety protection. 
The suggestions by the five companies to introduce organization ethical culture and 
information security culture reflect the advocacy in literature. Therefore, this research has 
bridged research and practice. The value-added impact of these advocacies is the multiplier 
effect of trust and commerce. When commerce is surrounded by mutual trust, it is expected 
business would flourish with lower transaction costs. 
Finally, this study proposed an exploratory framework that characterizes the significant 
relationships between information leakage and information sharing integrity.   
  
INSERT FIGURE 6 ABOUT HERE 
 
Figure 6 presents a framework that characterizes information leakage, the devastating 
consequences on information sharing integrity, and the human governance measures that help 
mitigate the iniquities of humans in sharing information. This framework could be a guide for 
practitioners to overcome information leakage issue in information sharing. The framework 
could also be further evaluated using empirical studies in future research to investigate the 
correlation that exists between human governance measures and information leakage.  
 
7. Conclusion  
This study adds value to the existing research and literature by highlighting the 
importance of human governance through fostering organizational ethical climate and 
information security culture in mitigating information leakage to achieve information sharing 
integrity, especially when companies have weak internal controls in information sharing. 
Practically, this study contributes to the industry and business that are striving towards solving 
the mounting problem of information leakage. Theoretically, this study adds value to the 
existing literature by raising the human factors such as the behavioural perspective of malicious 
insiders and cognitive perspective of accidental insiders, links to appropriate mitigation or 
governance strategies to pre-empt information leakage. Human factors and human governance 
deserve more research attention so managers and practitioners could take appropriate strategies 
to avert information leakage in order to achieve efficient and effective information sharing.  
This paper also contributes a research framework which could be a guide to overcome 
information leakage issue in information sharing.  
 This research is not without limitations. The current study involved MNC/MNEs 
operating in Malaysia while companies in other countries may have different ethical climate 
and information sharing culture. Thus, for future research, it will be good to replicate the study 
in a larger geographic region to verify the findings and insights of this research. We also highly 
recommend that inter-organizational information sharing of the case MNEs/MNCs should be 
solicited for further details when extending this study in the near future. This would allow the 
researcher to discover new insights into mitigating the impact of information leakage among 
the two parties in information sharing collaboration especially in supply chain integration. 
Besides, the applicability of a large-scale survey to verify the exploratory insights of this 
research and triangulate (two or more methods) its findings are suggested. Future research 
could possibly investigate the correlation between intentional leakage and unintentional 
leakage that can be addressed by organizational ethical climate (OEC) and information sharing 
culture (ISC) separately in order to achieve information sharing integrity. 
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APPENDIX 1 :  Interview Questions 
Q01 What are your views about information sharing? Its benefits and perils. 
Q02 With regards to information leakages, were there any such occurrences in your 
company? 
Q03 Did your company identify the perpetrator? Was the perpetrator a man or woman? 
Was he/she an executive, manager or a senior manager? 
Q04 What motivated the perpetrator to leak company data and information? What 
information was leaked then? 
Q05 How was the leakage dealt with by your company? 
Q06 In your opinion, how could a company prevent information leakage? 
Q07 Does your company have a code of ethics and what is the code about? How is this 
code communicated to employees? How does the company deal with employees 
breaking such codes? 
Q08 Has the code of ethics in anyway helped prevent or reduce information leakages? Has 
this code of ethics stopped you from leaking information? 
Q09 Why are such codes of ethics unable to stop information leakages? 
Q10 What do you fear most to deter you from committing an unauthorized information 
leak? Do you think your colleagues share this view? 
Q11 Let us discuss information security culture or habits. Are you always mindful of 
information protection and leakages? 
Q12 How frequent does your company remind you to safeguard data and information? 
How does the company communicate these reminders? 
Q13 We just want to find out the reality of things. Do you really care about these 
reminders? Why? 
Q14 Do you and your friends or colleagues talk about work (suppliers, contractors, and 
customers) during tea time and lunch hour? 
Q15 What would stop you from talking about work during tea time and lunch hour? 
Q16 Do you think it is possible to prevent information leakage? How and why? But is it 
practical? 
Q17 Does your company educate you about risky behaviours that could unintentionally 
leak data and information? In spite of such education, employees continue to show 
risky behaviours and put data at risks. Why is this so? What could change these risk 
behaviours? 
Q18 Who do you think are most likely to leak data and information? Could you profile 
perpetrators? Why? Have you encountered repeat offenders? 
Q19 What types of information are usually leaked? Could they be controlled? 
Q20 How does your company respond to a leakage? Keep quiet about it. Officially 
announce in the company bulletin board. “Leaked” such occurrences/incidences to 
employees through the grapevine. Hinting to employees. What do you think your 
company was trying to achieve? 
Q21 Do you think a company could stop a perpetrator before the information leakage 
occurs? 
Q22 Do you think it is good and effective to give rewards to informers or “whistle 
blowers” or recipients of such information before the perpetrator intentionally leaks 
information? Why? 
Q23 Do you think data and information would be safer in the future? 
Q24 How does your company foster the development of highly ethical, accountable and 
professional behaviour? 
Q25 Would a more stringent data protection act be helpful to curb information leakage? 
Q26 Do you think companies could criminalize (to declare illegal or to outlaw) 
information leakage (intentional and unintentional) just like the Official Secrets Act? 
Is it practical? 
Q27 Are there ways to detect an imminent data and information leakage? 
Q28 One of the greatest irony is “we do not know when data or information is lost.” If this 
is true, how do we then know when and to whom data and information is lost? 
 
 
